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Abstract
An increasing attention has been recently paid to studying the confrontation between a defender of a
network and an aggressor who attacks selected targets and spreads the attack through the network in an
infection-like manner. While to date the literature focused on the scenarios in which such spread follows
a chance mechanism, in this paper we propose and analyze the first defender-attacker model in which
the attacker is able to strategically guide the whole course of the attack spread. We find that even if
the attacker knows the distribution of security resources chosen by the defender, finding an optimal plan
of attack is NP-hard in a general case. However, we show that it is possible to efficiently find optimal
strategies of the attacker and the defender for some simple network structures, such as cliques, stars, and
trees. For more sophisticated network structures, we propose near-optimal strategies for both players.
1 Introduction
In recent years there is a growing interest in the topic of security games [38], a particular type of Stackelberg
games [51]. Typically, this problem considers a confrontation between two players: the defender, e.g., a police
force trying to protect certain resources or locations, and the attacker, e.g., a criminal organization intending
to gain control over the locations or the resources. One of the milestones proving the effectiveness of such
models is the ARMOR system used to protect the LAX airport [35]. Its success led to the development of
many other systems based on security games [47, 46, 41].
Part of this body of work considers a potential spread of the attack after hitting the initial target. In
particular, Bachrach et al. [7] created a variation of the security game model with stochastic contagion
between two targets. The idea was later expanded by adding a whole network of interdependencies between
targets, with each defender guarding either a single target [1] or multiple targets [30]. However, all these
models focus on the case of stochastic contagion of the attack, i.e., only the choice of the initial target by
the attacker is strategic, while later propagation of the attack is purely random. This is unfortunately not
suitable for a number of scenarios.
In particular, many highly dangerous criminal organizations recruit members by carefully selecting poten-
tial candidates using social ties of the existing members [20]. Similarly, terrorist organizations utilize social
networks to carefully select potential members [21] taking advantage of kinship and friendship ties in some
cases [39]. In such scenarios, the attacker can be interpreted as a representative of a covert organization, who
intends to strategically select potential candidates from neighbors of already-recruited members in a social
network. A possible strategy would be to select the most vulnerable candidates, i.e., those whose many
social contacts are already recruited and who are, therefore, more susceptible due to multiple reinforcement
from different social ties [13, 12, 11]. On the other hand, the defender can be interpreted as the police
or a charitable institution, whose goal is to prevent the criminal degeneration or radicalization of a local
community and who has limited security resources to distribute over the social networks in an attempt to
achieve this goal. This suggests that recruitment has a highly planned, non-stochastic nature.
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Marketing campaigns also target potential customers based on information of their social networks and
therefore competing campaigns can be seen as players in a Stackelberg game. In this interpretation the
attacker is a new entrant trying to steal potential customers from its competitor, while the competitor (the
defender) tries to preserve its customer base and decrease the attrition rate by providing a number of special
offers to the customers who are most likely inclined to switch to another company. Both players can utilize
social networks of customers to either recruit new clients or retain existing ones. In this Stackelberg game,
the attacker wants to minimize the cost of the campaign by selectively choosing its next target to provide
free offers to, assuming that the chance of switching sides by customers is positively correlated with the
number of their neighbors who have already switched to the new offer [19]. This holds for instance, for
mobile network carriers or cloud service providers. On the other hand, the defender fights back by offering
free offers to customers who are more susceptible to switch due to the high number of switching friend in
order to derail the efforts of the attacker. Again, this suggest that the attack is strategic and not stochastic
in this scenario.
Unfortunately, the existing models are inadequate for such applications. On one hand, the aforementioned
defender-attacker literature [7, 1, 30] assumes stochastic contagion of the attack over the network. On the
other hand, the existing models of strategic diffusion [5] do not assume an optimizing defender of the network
against an attacker who tries to optimize a spread, i.e., they only model the diffusion aspect of the problem.
Against this background, we propose and analyze the first Stackelberg game between the defender and
the attacker of the network where the attacker strategically guides the course of network diffusion. At the
beginning of the game, the defender distributes security resources among the nodes of the network. Next,
having observed the security efforts of the defender, the attacker chooses the sequence in which the nodes
are to be attacked, where the probability of successfully attacking a certain node is proportional to the
number of already infected neighbors of this node. Within this model, we investigate two main questions:
how difficult it is for the attacker to find an optimal way of attacking the network and what are the effective
ways of defending the network from a fully sequential strategic attack? Our results can be summarized as
follows:
• We find that even if the attacker knows the distribution of security resources chosen by the defender,
finding an optimal plan of the attack is NP-hard in a general case. This result suggests that the
situation of the defender is better when we consider strategic diffusion in comparison to the standard
settings of security games, where finding an optimal attack plan can be often done in polynomial time.
• However, the above worst-case complexity result may not hold under various specific conditions. In
particular, we show that it is possible to efficiently find optimal strategies of the attacker and the
defender for some simple network structures, such as cliques, stars, and trees.
• Next, we formulate the problem of finding an optimal defender strategy as a mixed-integer linear
programming. This allows us to find effective defense strategies in various settings when the exhaustive
search of the attacker’s strategies is possible.
• Furthermore, we propose various heuristic strategies for the defender that are inspired by the scenarios
of potential attacks. In particular, we focus on the heuristics based on three fundamental centrality
measures: degree, closeness, and betweenness. We also consider various heuristic strategies for the
attacker such as the ones that were found effective in the work of Alshamsi et al. [5], as well as
strategies based on exploration-exploitation techniques [45].
• Finally, we evaluate empirically all the heuristics through computer simulations in different scenarios
and for different types of complex networks.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The related work is discussed in Section 2. The
necessary notation and definitions are provided in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the security diffusion
game—the main focus of our analysis. In Section 5, we provide the complexity analysis of finding an
optimal strategy of the attacker in both general, and specific network structures. Furthermore, we present
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a dynamic-programming algorithm to generate an optimal attack strategy given any distribution of the
defender’s security resources. Finally, we show how to use mixed-integer linear programming to compute
optimal defense strategies when the set of strategies of the attacker is of reasonable size. In Section 6, we
propose various heuristics for the defender and the attacker and, in Section 7, we empirically evaluate their
effectiveness. Conclusions and the discussion of possible directions for future work follow.
2 Related Work
Game theory allows for explicit modeling of adversarial reasoning in many scenarios where an allocation of
security resources is required. A particular type of the game that is especially suited in security scenarios are
Stackelberg games [51], in which a leader player moves first and then, having observed the leader’s strategy,
the follower players move sequentially. The security forces—i.e., the defenders—are typically modeled as
leaders of a Stackelberg game, while the attackers (be they criminals, terrorists, cyber-criminals, enemy
combatants, etc.) become the followers, who have a chance to observe, at least partially, the strategy
assumed by the leaders. As already mentioned in the introduction, the first algorithm in this spirit that
was applied in practice and delivered very promising results was the ARMOR system used to protect the
LAX airport [35]. The key advantage over previous approaches in security resource allocation is that such
security games address the key weakness of human schedulers, i.e., predictability. Other applications of this
type of games are planning peacekeeping operations [48], utilizing anti-virus software to protect computer
networks [3] and increasing safety of vehicular networks [4]. There exists a number of other security-related
models of the confrontation between two players in the network, including the seeker-evader models of
evading social network analysis tools [53, 52] and the models of protecting network using discrete honeypot
tokens [43]. However, our work is more closely related to the domain of security games with continuous
security resources.
Security games have been also studied in the network context. Bachrach et al. [7] was the first to
combine a Stackelberg security game model with the model of a contagious attack inspired by the works of
Kunreuther and Heal [28] as well as Johnson et al. [25], among others. The key characteristic of their model
is also included in ours, namely that the attacker is able to observe the security efforts of the defender before
choosing her own actions. However, unlike in our model, Bachrach et al. assume stochastic contagion. The
same assumption of stochastic contagion is also made in the follow-up works by Acemoglu et al. [1] and Lou
et al. [30]. Another difference between our model and the works by Bachrach et al., Acemoglu et al.and Lou
et al. is that, in these three works, the authors focus their attention on the defender’s strategies. Conversely,
the attacker’s strategy is usually assumed to be relatively simple, e.g., the node attacked is typically the
one that provides the highest probability of success. However, in the case of strategic diffusion considered
in our work, the attacker’s strategy is no longer just a choice of a single node, but rather of a sequence of
them. This higher number of degrees of freedom leads, among others, to a variety of the attacker’s heuristic
strategies that we study in this work.
While the strategic diffusion part of our model is inspired by the work of Alshamsi et al. [5], our model
is different in a few important aspects. Firstly, we assume the attacker has limited time to complete her
mission. For instance, if a covert organization aims to recruit new operatives to attempt a strike before a
certain event (e.g., elections), then there is clearly a time limit to do so. Hence, in our model we introduce
the time limit after which the defender discovers the attack and stops it. The second difference is that
while Alshamsi et al.describes the process of activation in terms of repeated attempts to activate each node
where a failed attack can be repeated indefinitely many times, in our model, following the aforementioned
time-limit assumption, we assign each node a time of activation (equal to the expected time of activation in
Alshamsi et al.’s model) to indicate the difficulty of targeting the node.
3
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present notation and fundamental theoretical concepts that will be used throughout the
paper.
3.1 Graph Notation
Let G = (V,E) be a network, where V = {v1, . . . , vn} denotes the set of n nodes and E ⊆ V × V denotes
the set of edges. Let G(V ) be a set of all networks over the set of nodes V . We denote an edge between
nodes vi and vj by (vi, vj). In this work, we consider only undirected networks, i.e., networks in which we do
not discern between edges (vi, vj) and (vj , vi). We also assume that networks do not contain self-loops, i.e.,
∀vi∈V (vi, vi) /∈ E. We denote by NG(vi) the set of neighbours of vi in G, i.e., NG(vi) = {vj ∈ V : (vi, vj) ∈
E}. Furthermore, we denote by dG(vi) the degree of vi in G, i.e., dG(vi) = |NG(vi)|.
We will also use a concept of a path in the graph. In particular, a path is a sequence of distinct nodes,
〈vl, . . . , vk〉, such that every two consecutive nodes are connected by an edge. The length of a path is the
number of edges in that path.
Let Γ(V ) denote the set of all sequences of elements from V without repetitions. Let γi denote the i-th
element of sequence γ ∈ Γ(V ). Finally, let |γ| denote the number of elements in γ ∈ Γ(V ).
We will often omit the network itself from the notation when it is clear from the context, e.g., by writing
N(v) instead of NG(v).
Having introduced fundamental notation and notation pertaining to networks, let us briefly discuss the
same for centrality measures, security games and strategic diffusion in networks.
3.2 Centrality Measures
In graph theory and social network analysis, the importance of nodes is quantified using functions of the
form: c : G(V ) × V → R, called centrality measures. Three such fundamental centrality measures are the
degree centrality [40], the closeness centrality [9], and the betweeness centrality [6, 17].
Specifically, given a node vi ∈ V and an undirected network, we have that the formula of degree centrality
is:
cdegr(vi) =
d(vi)
n− 1 ,
In words, degree centrality ranks the nodes simply according to their number of neighbors.
The formula of closeness centrality is:
cclos(vi) =
n− 1∑
vj∈V dist(vi, vj)
,
where dist(vi, vj) denotes the distance between vi and vj . Intuitively, closeness centrality focuses on distances
among nodes and gives high value to the nodes that are, on average, close to all other nodes.
Finally the formula of betweenness centrality is:
cbetw(vi) =
2
(n− 1)(n− 2)
∑
vj ,vk∈V \{vi}
|{p ∈ sp(vj , vk) : vi ∈ p}|
|sp(vj , vk)| ,
where spG(vi, vj) denotes the set of all shortest paths between any pair of nodes, vi and vj . Thus, in words,
betweenness centrality considers all shortest paths between any two nodes in the network. The more such
shortest paths a particular node belongs to, the more important it is.
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Figure 1: Three phases of a sample security diffusion game on a network consisting of 9 nodes. (a) The
defender assigns available security resources to all the nodes (denoted by numbers in blue inside the nodes).
(b) The attacker picks the first target of the attack (the node in red). The factorial next to each neighbour
of the attacked node shows the amount of time necessary to activate it. The time of activation decreases
with the number of active neighbours of a given node (numbers in red), but increases with the node’s degree
(numbers in grey) and with the amount of security resources assigned to the node by the defender (numbers
in blue). (c) The attacker strategically spreads the attack to other nodes in the network (red arrows indicate
the direction of the attack).
3.3 Security Games
As already mentioned, security games are meant to capture the dynamics of conflicts between a defender,
who is supposed to protect a given set of potential targets, and an attacker, who aims to maximize the
damage to the targets [33, 24]. As in Stackelberg games [51], the defender makes her move first, by assigning
a certain security level si to any potential target i which results in a certain security cost ci. These security
efforts are observed by the attacker, who then allocates her attack resources ai to any potential target
i. The probability of a successful attack is usually computed using a variation of the Tullock function [49]:
p(si, ai) =
ai
si+ai
. These notations present main ideas of security games and will not be used in the remainder
of the paper.
3.4 Strategic Diffusion
Thus far, the literature focused on stochastic models of diffusion [27, 2]. Since such models do not fit
scenarios in which the attacks are planned strategically, Alshamsi et al. [5] have recently introduced a model
of diffusion in which the attacker aims to optimally choose her attack sequence. At the beginning of the
process only one chosen node of the network, the seed, is activated. Then, the player chooses a sequence
γ ∈ Γ(V ) that provides the order in which nodes will be activated. The probability of successful activation
of a node v in one attempt is given by p(v) = β
(
|N(v)∩I|
d(v)
)α
where I is the set of currently activated nodes
(at the beginning of the process it consists only of the seed), and α, β ∈ [0, 1] are constants. Unless stated
otherwise, we will assume that α = β = 1. The expected time of activation of node v is 1p(v) .
4 The Model of Security Diffusion Games
A security diffusion game is based on combining ideas of security games and strategic diffusion in networks.
Definition 1 (Security Diffusion Game). The security diffusion game is a Stackelberg game between two
players, the defender (the leader) and the attacker (the follower). It is defined by a tuple (G,Φ, T ), where
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G = (V,E) is a given network, Φ ∈ R+ is the amount of security resources available to the defender, and
T ∈ R+ is the attacker’s time limit before the defender discovers the attack and stops it completely.
The game has two steps:
• Step 1—at the beginning of the game, the defender distributes security resources among nodes of the
network, i.e., she chooses φ : V → R such that ∀v∈V φ(v) ≥ 0 and
∑
v∈V φ(v) ≤ Φ.
• Step 2— next, having observed the security efforts of the defender in Step 1, the attacker chooses the
sequence, γ ∈ Γ(V ), in which nodes will be targeted for attacks. The first node in the sequence (the seed
node) is activated in time τ(v) = d(v)+φ(v). The activation time for all other nodes is τ(v) = d(v)+φ(v)|N(v)∩I|
where I is the set of currently activated nodes.
The utilities of the attacker and the defender are denoted uA and uD, respectively, and are functions of
the network, the distribution of security resources, the sequence of the attack, and the time limit T :
uD = f
D(G,φ, γ, T );
uA = f
A(G,φ, γ, T ).
In this work we assume that uA = η(γ, T ), where η(γ, T ) denotes the number of nodes activated within
time limit T when using attack sequence γ (to simplify the notation we assume that the network and the
distribution of security resources are known from context). Furthermore, to express the competitive nature
of the game, we define the utility of the defender as uD = −uA = −η(γ, T ), which makes the security
diffusion game a zero-sum game.
Note that under these assumptions a node (unless it is the seed node) needs at least one activated neighbor
in order to become activated. We allow the attacker to choose the seed node. Clearly, different forms of
time of activation of the seed node can be considered but we chose it to be the maximal possible time of
activation of the node.
We choose this particular form of activation time to combine notions from strategic diffusion [5] (i.e.,
the time or cost of attack decreases with the number of attacked neighbors) and from security games [33]
(i.e., investing more security resources makes the node harder to activate). We choose Tullock function to
capture these notions as it is widely used in the security games literature [7, 1, 30] and it has desirable
properties [42, 7]. The time of activation is decreasing with the proportion of activated neighbours and
increasing with the total degree of the node, which is a well established idea in the diffusion models [27, 5]
and complex contagion [13] literature. In cyber-security security domain a similar idea is expressed by the
Byzantine generals problem [29].
Figure 1 presents three phases of a sample security diffusion game on a network consisting of 9 nodes.
Having defined the game that is the main focus of our study, we move to its theoretical analysis.
5 Computational Analysis
We begin our analysis of the model of security diffusion by formulating the choice of the attacker’s strategy
as a computational problem and studying its complexity in a general case (Section 5.1). We then move
to analyzing the same problem for cliques, stars, and trees (Section 5.2). Finally, we propose a dynamic-
programming algorithm that generates the optimal attack strategy given any distribution of the defender’s
security resources (Section 5.3).
5.1 Hardness result
The Optimal Attack Problem is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Optimal Attack Problem). This problem is defined by a tuple (G,φ, vS , T ), where G = (V,E)
is a given network, φ : V → R is the defender’s distribution of security resources, vS ∈ V is the seed node
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of the attacker, and T is the attacker’s time limit. The goal is to identify γ∗ ∈ Γ(V ) such that γ∗ is in
arg maxγ∈Γ(V ):γ1=vS η(γ, T ).
1
Intuitively, the goal is to find the attacker’s plan starting at the seed node, activating the maximal
possible number of nodes within the time limit. The following result holds.
Theorem 1. The Optimal Attack problem is NP-complete.
Proof. The decision version of the optimization problem is the following: given a network G = (V,E), a
distribution of security resources φ, a seed node vS , a time limit T , and a value r
∗ ∈ N expressing the
number of nodes to be activated within time limit, does there exist a sequence of nodes γ∗ ∈ Γ(V ) such that
η(γ∗, T ) ≥ r∗?
This problem clearly is in NP. This is because, given a solution, i.e., a sequence γ∗ ∈ Γ(V ), we can compute
the time of activation of every node in the sequence, and verify in polynomial time whether η(γ∗, T ) ≥ r∗.
To prove NP-hardness, we will show a reduction from the NP-complete 3-Set Cover problem. To this
end, we will build a network that reflects the structure of a given 3-Set Cover problem instance, and use it
as an input for the Optimal Attack problem. Finally, we will show that an optimal solution of the Optimal
Attack problem corresponds to a solution of the given instance of the 3-Set Cover problem.
More formally, an instance of the NP-complete 3-Set Cover problem is defined by a universe U =
{u1, . . . , um}, a collection of sets S = {S1, . . . , Sk} such that ∀jSj ⊂ U and ∀j |Sj | = 3, and an integer
b ≤ k. The goal is to determine whether there exist b elements of S, the union of which equals U . In what
follows, let σ(ui) = |{Sj ∈ S : ui ∈ Sj}|, i.e., σ(ui) is the number of sets in S that contain ui.
First, let us create a network G that reflects the structure of the instance of the 3-Set Cover problem
under consideration. It is shown in Figure 2, where:
• The set of nodes: For every Si ∈ S, we create a single node, denoted by Si. For every ui ∈ U , we
create a single node, denoted by ui, as well as 4k nodes ai,1, . . . , ai,k. Moreover, for every uj ∈ U and
every Si ∈ S such that uj ∈ Si, we create a single node li,j . Additionally, we create a single node vS .
• The set of edges: For every node Si ∈ S we create an edge (Si, vS). For every node ai,j we create
an edge (ai,j , ui). Finally, for every node li,j we create two edges, (Si, li,j) and (uj , li,j).
Next, let φ∗ be a distribution of security resources such that:
• φ∗(vS) = 0,
• φ∗(ai,j) = 0 for every node ai,j ,
• φ∗(ui) = k − σ(ui) for every node ui,
• φ∗(Si) = 20mk for every node Si,
• φ∗(li,j) = 20mk + 2 for every node li,j .
This particular distribution of security resources has the following properties:
• it gives each node ui the same probability of activation (assuming an equal number of activated
neighbors), and
• it gives each of the nodes Si and li,j the maximal probability of activation that is lower than the
minimal probability of activation of nodes ui, i.e., activating node Si or li,j always takes more time
than activating node ui, no matter what the number of active neighbors is.
1Recall that η(γ, T ) denotes the number of nodes activated within time limit T when using attack sequence γ.
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Figure 2: The network used to reduce the 3-Set Cover problem to the Optimal Attack problem. The seed
node, vS , is marked black. Blue numbers in the parenthesis show the order of nodes that have to be activated
before activating node a1,1.
These properties will play an important role later in the proof. Furthermore, let:
T ∗ = (b+m)(20mk + 4) + 9mk + 1
and
r∗ = b+ (4k + 2)m.
These are the time and the number of activated nodes of the strategy that corresponds to a solution to the
3-Set Cover problem.
Now, consider the instance of the Optimal Attack problem in the form of (G,φ∗, vS , T ∗, r∗). We will
show next that an optimal solution to this instance corresponds to an optimal solution to the 3-Set Cover
problem. We begin by observing that the following holds for the times of activation of the nodes in V :
• τ(ai,j) = 1 for every node ai,j , as we have d(ai,j) + φ∗(ai,j) = 1 and |N(ai,j) ∩ I| ≤ 1;
• τ(ui) ≤ 5k for every ui ∈ U , as we have d(ui) + φ∗(ui) = 5k and |N(ui) ∩ I| ≥ 1;
• 5mk + 1 ≤ τ(Si) ≤ 20mk + 4 for every Si ∈ S, as we have d(Si) + φ∗(Si) = 20mk + 4 and 1 ≤
|N(Si) ∩ I| ≤ 4;
• 10mk + 2 ≤ τ(li,j) ≤ 20mk + 4 for every node li,j , as we have d(li,j) + φ∗(li,j) = 20mk + 4 and
1 ≤ |N(li,j) ∩ I| ≤ 2.
We will now show that if there exists a solution S∗ ⊂ S to the given instance of the 3-Set Cover
problem, then there exists a solution γ∗ to the constructed instance of the Optimal Attack problem such
that η(γ∗, T ∗) = r∗ = b + (4k + 2)m. Indeed, we can construct such solution by activating every node
Si ∈ S∗ (b nodes activated in time b(20mk + 4)), choosing for every uj ∈ U node Si ∈ S∗ such that uj ∈ Si
and activating nodes li,j and uj (2m nodes activated in time (20mk+ 4)m+ 5mk), and finally activating all
nodes ai,j (4mk nodes activated in time 4mk).
In what follows, let γ∗T denote the maximum prefix of γ
∗ such that τ(γ∗T ) < T
∗. Now, we have to show
that if there exists a solution γ∗ to the constructed instance of the Optimal Attack problem, then there
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exists also a solution S∗ ⊂ S to the given instance of the 3-Set Cover problem. To this end, we will show
that for the prefix γ∗T of any such solution γ
∗ it must be that, for every uj ∈ U , there exists a node Si ∈ γ∗T
such that uj ∈ Si and |γ∗T ∩S| ≤ b. Notice that when this is the case we can obtain the solution to the given
instance of the 3-Set Cover problem by taking S∗ = γ∗T ∩ S.
First, we observe that any sequence γ∗T , that does not contain all nodes ui, cannot have the required
number of r∗ activated nodes within the time limit. Assume to the contrary, that there exists such a
sequence. Since there exists node ui that is not activated, neither of the nodes ai,j are activated. Therefore
this sequence has to activate 4k + 1 of the nodes Si or li,j instead. However, there are only 4k nodes Si
and li,j . Hence, sequence γ
∗
T that is a solution of the constructed instance of the Optimal Attack problem
must activate all nodes uj . In order to activate given node uj we need to activate at least one node li,j ,
and in order to achieve that we need to activate node Si. Therefore, because of the way we constructed the
network, for every uj ∈ U there exists a node Si ∈ γ∗T such that uj ∈ Si.
Now we need to show that for γ∗T being a solution of the constructed instance of the Optimal Attack
problem we have |γ∗T ∩ S| ≤ b, i.e., that any sequence being solution cannot activate more than b nodes Si
within time limit. As shown above, γ∗T has to activate all uj nodes. Notice that in order to activate uj we have
to activate a node li,j with only one activated neighbor (its only other neighbor being uj). Activating m such
nodes takes m(20mk+ 4) time. Hence, in order to activate more than b nodes Si within time limit we would
have to do it in time shorter (as we still have to activate nodes uj) than T
∗−m(20mk+4) = b(20mk+4)+9mk.
Now, activating node Si (including the time necessary to activate neighboring nodes li,j) takes time:
• 20mk + 4 when activating with only one active neighbor vS ;
• 20mk+42 + (20mk + 4) when activating with two active neighbors;
• 20mk+43 + 2(20mk + 4) when activating with three active neighbors;
• 20mk+44 + 3(20mk + 4) when activating with four active neighbors.
This is because, in order to be used to speed up the activation of node Si, node li,j has to be activated
beforehand, in time 20mk+ 4. Hence, activating a single node Si takes at least 20mk+ 4 time and it is not
possible to activate more than b nodes Si in time b(20mk + 4) + 9mk.
This implies that the optimal solution to the constructed instance of the Optimal Attack problem must
correspond to the optimal solution to the given instance of the 3-Set Cover problem, thus concluding the
proof.
5.2 Optimal Strategies for Cliques, Stars and Trees
Our result in the previous section states that even if the attacker is given complete information about the
activities of the defender, finding an optimal strategy of the attack is a computationally intractable task.
However, as we will now show, it is possible to find such an optimal strategies analytically for some simple
network structures.
Theorem 2. Let network G = (V,E) be a clique, i.e., ∀v,w∈V (v, w) ∈ E. Given a particular distribution of
security resources φ, an optimal attack sequence is γ∗, where nodes are ordered non-decreasingly according
to assigned security resources, i.e., ∀i<jφ(γ∗i ) ≤ φ(γ∗j ).
An optimal defense strategy against an optimal attack strategy is to spread security resources uniformly,
i.e., ∀v∈V φ∗(v) = Φn .
Proof. Since the network is a clique, the activation time of i-th node in sequence γ is n−1+φ(γi)max(1,i−1) . This is
because γi has n− 1 neighbors, i− 1 of which have been already activated).
First we prove our claim about the strategy of the attacker.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume to the contrary, that in an optimal attack sequence γ we have
φ(γi) > φ(γj) for i < j such that i > 1 and j > 2 (notice that we can always swap first and second element
of the sequence as the sum of their activation times remains the same). However, such a sequence can be
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improved by swapping elements i and j. Let τij be the time of activation of γi and γj before such a swap,
and τji after the swap (note that the activation times of all other nodes remain the same after the swap).
We have that (notice that max(1, i− 1) = i− 1 and max(1, j − 1) = j − 1 for i > 1 and j > 2):
τji − τij =
(
n− 1 + φ(γj)
i− 1 +
n− 1 + φ(γi)
j − 1
)
−
(
n− 1 + φ(γi)
i− 1 +
n− 1 + φ(γj)
j − 1
)
=
φ(γi)− φ(γj)
j − 1 −
φ(γi)− φ(γj)
i− 1 < 0.
Therefore, in an optimal sequence, for i < j such that i > 1 and j > 2 we always have φ(γi) ≤ φ(γj).
We will now prove our claim about the strategy of the defender. The proof is by contradiction. Assume to
the contrary, that in an optimal distribution of security resources φ we have i > 1 such that φ(γ∗i ) 6= φ(γ∗i+1),
where γ∗ is an optimal attack sequence (again, notice that we can always swap the first and the second
elements in the attack sequence as the sum of their activation times remains the same). Since γ∗ is an
optimal attack sequence we have that φ(γ∗i ) < φ(γ
∗
i+1). However, such φ can be improved by setting φ(γ
∗
i )
and φ(γ∗i+1) to their average. Let τ1 be time of activation of γ
∗
i and γ
∗
i+1 before the change, and τ2 after the
change (the activation times of all other nodes remain the same after the change). We have:
τ2 − τ1 =
(
n− 1 + φ(γ
∗
i )+φ(γ
∗
i+1)
2
i− 1 +
n− 1 + φ(γ
∗
i )+φ(γ
∗
i+1)
2
i
)
−
(
n− 1 + φ(γ∗i )
i− 1 +
n− 1 + φ(γ∗i+1)
i
)
=
φ(γ∗i+1)− φ(γ∗i )
2(i− 1) −
φ(γ∗i+1)− φ(γ∗i )
2i
=
φ(γ∗i+1)− φ(γ∗i )
2i(i+ 1)
> 0.
Therefore, in an optimal sequence distribution of security resources we have φ(γ∗i ) = φ(γ
∗
i+1) for i > 1.
We also know optimal strategies for a star network.
Theorem 3. Let network G = (V,E) be a star with center a and peripheral nodes b1, . . . , bn−1. Let φ be a
particular distribution of security resources (assume that nodes bi are ordered non-decreasingly according to
φ(bi)). An optimal attack sequence is then:
• γ∗ = 〈a, b1, b2, . . . , bn−1〉 if φ(b1) ≥ φ(a) + n− 2 (i.e., when a has the lowest time of activation)
• γ∗ = 〈b1, a, b2, . . . , bn−1〉 otherwise.
An optimal defense strategy against an optimal attack strategy is then:
• φ∗(a) = Φ−(n−1)(n−2)n and φ∗(bi) = Φ+n−2n if T ≤ Φ+2(n−1)n ,
• φ∗(a) = 0 and φ∗(bi) = Φn−1 if Φ+2(n−1)n < T ≤ Φ+n−1n−1 ,
• φ∗(a) = Φ and φ∗(bi) = 0 otherwise.
In words, an optimal strategy of the attacker is to attack nodes in non-decreasing order of their activation
times, with the additional constraint that the center of the star has to be one of the first two nodes in the
sequence. As for the defender strategy, if it is possible not to let the attacker activate even a single node
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given the time limit, then the defender should try to make the time of activation equal for all nodes (if
possible) or all peripheral nodes (if there are not enough security resources). Alternatively, the defender
should assign all security resources to the central node (since again, it has to be one of the first two nodes
in the sequence).
Proof. First we prove our claim about the strategy of the attacker.
Notice that node a has to be either first or second node in the attack sequence, as the attacker either
starts with it, or it is the only neighbor of the starting node (if attacker starts with one of the peripheral
nodes). Hence, it has activation time of τ(a) = n− 1 + φ(a).
Similarly, any node bi is either first in the sequence or is activated when exactly one of its neighbors
(central node a) is active. Hence, its activation time is τ(bi) = 1 + φ(bi).
If it is impossible to activate more than one node within time limit, the sequence γ∗ is optimal because
the first node has the lowest time of activation in the entire network.
Now consider a case where it is possible to activate at least two nodes within the time limit. Assume to
the contrary, that in an optimal attack sequence, γ, we have bj activated before bi for i < j (as mentioned
above, node a has to be either on the first or the second position in the sequence and we can swap these
nodes without changing the total activation time). However, such sequence can be improved by swapping
elements bi and bj . The argument follows the same logic as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Now we move to proving our claim about the strategy of the defender.
First, consider a case in which it is possible not to let attacker activate even a single node, i.e., ∀v∈V τ(v) ≥
T . It is then optimal for the defender to have the same activation time for all nodes (as the attacker will pick
the one with lowest activation time as the first in sequence). Hence, we have τ(a) = φ∗(a)+n−1 = φ∗(bi)+1 =
τ(bi) and φ
∗(a) + (n − 1)φ∗(bi) = Φ. After solving this set of equations we get φ∗(a) = Φ−(n−1)(n−2)n and
φ∗(bi) = Φ+n−2n . We then have τ(a) = τ(bi) =
Φ+2(n−1)
n . Since we consider a case in which it is possible not
to let attacker activate even a single node, we need to have τ(a) = τ(bi) =
Φ+2(n−1)
n ≥ T .
Notice that it is possible that the defender does not have enough defense resources to make time of
activation of all nodes equal (when Φ < (n − 1)(n − 2)). She should then spread them uniformly among
peripheral nodes, to maximize the minimal time of activation in the network. We then have φ∗(a) = 0 and
φ∗(bi) = Φn−1 . Minimal time of activation in the network is then τ(bi) =
Φ+n−1
n−1 and in order for this strategy
to be optimal we need to have τ(bi) =
Φ+n−1
n−1 ≥ T .
Now, consider the case in which the attacker is able to activate k ≥ 1 nodes. One of the first two nodes
in the sequence has to be a. Hence, assigning all security resources to a:
• either maximizes the time required to activate available number of nodes—if k ≥ 2 as their total
activation time is φ(a) +
∑k−1
i=1 φ(bi)),
• or it maximizes the time that would be necessary to activate second node in the sequence—if k = 1.
We can also efficiently find an optimal attack sequence for a tree.
Theorem 4. Let network G be a tree. The optimal strategy of the attacker can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. In Algorithm 1, we present the pseudocode of the algorithm for computing the optimal attacker’s
strategy on a tree starting from an a priori given node. It performs the exhaustive search of all possible
strategies of the attacker by traversing the tree in a bottom-up fashion. In the pseudocode, Vbotup denotes
the sequence of nodes in V in a bottom-up order (when vS is the root), c(v) denotes the sequence of the
children of v, ci(v) denotes the i-th node in this sequence, and t(v) denotes the size of the subtree with v as
the root. We denote the concatenation of sequences using the ⊕ symbol.
One can notice that, in the case of a tree, every node other than the seed node has exactly one active
neighbor at the moment of activation. Hence, its time of activation is always d(v) + φ(v). In what follows,
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Algorithm 1: Finding the optimal attack sequence for a tree.
Input: Tree G = (V,E), distribution of security resources φ, time limit T , starting node vS .
Output: Optimal attack sequence starting with node vS
1 for v ∈ V do
2 for k ∈ 〈1, . . . , n〉 do
3 x[v, k]←∞
4 for v ∈ Vbotup do // loop over all nodes in bottom-up order
5 τ [v, 0]← 0
6 γ[v, 0]← ∅
7 τ [v, 1]← d(v) + φ(v)
8 γ[v, 1]← 〈v〉
9 if d(v) > 1 then // if v is not a leaf aggregate results from children
10 for k ∈ 〈1, . . . , t(c1(v))〉 do // choose targets only from the subtree of the first child
11 y[1, k]← d(v) + φ(v) + τ [c1(v), k − 1]
12 q[1, k]← 〈v〉 ⊕ γ[c1(v), k − 1]
13 l← t(c1(v)) + 1
14 for m ∈ 〈2, . . . , |c(v)|〉 do // choose targets from the subtrees of the first m children
15 l← l + t(cm(v))
16 for k ∈ 〈1, . . . , l〉 do // loop over the number of attacked nodes
17 y[m, k]←∞
18 for i ∈ 〈1, . . . , k〉 do // loop over the number of attacked nodes we select from the subtrees of the
first m− 1 children
19 y˜ ← y[m− 1, i] + τ [cm(v), k − i]
20 if y˜ < y[m, k] then
21 y[m, k]← y˜
22 q[m, k]← q[m− 1, i]⊕ γ[cm(v), k − i]
23 for k ∈ 〈2, . . . , t(v)〉 do // transfer results to tables τ and γ
24 τ [v, k]← y[|c(v)|, k]
25 γ[v, k]← q[|c(v)|, k]
26 return maxk:τ [vS ,k]<T γ[vS , k]
we will call this value the weight of node v. The task of finding the optimal strategy of the attacker boils
down to finding the largest subtree with the sum of weights lower than T . Algorithm 1 achieves this goal by
filling tables τ and γ.
Entry τ [v, k] contains the weight of the lightest subtree with k nodes rooted at v, while γ[v, k] contains
the nodes in this subtree (in the order of activation). Computing values of τ [v, 0] and τ [v, 1] (as well as
γ[v, 0] and γ[v, 1]) is trivial. If node v is not a leaf, we compute τ [v, k] and γ[v, k] for k > 1 by filling tables
y and q.
Entry y[m, k] contains the weight of the lightest subtree with k nodes rooted at v, constructed by using
only the descendants of the first m children of v. Entry q[m, k] contains nodes in this subtree (in the order
of activation). In lines 18-22, we check all possible values of y[m, k] by taking i nodes from the first m − 1
children of v (and v itself) and adding to them k − i nodes from the subtree of the m-th child of v.
Instructions in lines 11-12 as well as instructions in lines 24-25 are run O(n2) times, since the loop in
line 4 is run exactly n times and, for any v, we have t(v) ≤ n. One can notice that the body of the loop in
line 14 is run exactly n− 1 times in total (because it is a loop over children of node v and every node other
than vS has exactly one parent). Since both l ≤ n and k ≤ n, instructions in lines 19-22, driving the time
complexity of the algorithm, are run O(n3) times. Hence, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n3). The
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memory complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n2) if we represent sequences in tables γ and q as trees visited in a
prefix order.
5.3 The Dynamic-Programming Algorithm
In this section, we present a dynamic-programming algorithm to find the optimal strategy of the attacker.
Its pseudocode can be found in Algorithm 2. The algorithm computes the strategy that yields the highest
possible utility of the attacker against a given distribution of security resources. The ⊕ symbol denotes the
concatenation of sequences.
Algorithm 2: A dynamic-programming algorithm for the optimal strategy of the attacker.
Input: The network (V,E), the defender’s distribution of security resources φ, the seed node vS ∈ V ,
and the attacker’s time limit T .
Output: Attacker’s sequence of activation starting with vS of maximal length given the time limit.
1 for C ⊆ V do
2 τ∗[C]←∞
3 τ∗[{vS}]← 0
4 γ∗[{vS}]← 〈vS〉
5 for k = 1, . . . , n− 1 do
6 for C ⊂ V : (|C| = k) ∧ (τ∗[C] <∞) do
7 for v ∈ V : (v /∈ C) ∧ (N(v) ∩ C 6= ∅) do
8 ∆τ ← d(v)+φ(v)|N(v)∩C|
9 if (τ∗[C] + ∆τ < τ∗[C ∪ {i}]) ∧ (τ∗[C] + ∆τ < T ) then
10 τ∗[C ∪ {i}]← τ∗[C] + ∆τ
11 γ∗[C ∪ {i}]← γ∗[C]⊕ 〈i〉
12 if ¬∃C⊆V |C| = k + 1 ∧ τ∗[C] <∞ then
13 return γ∗[arg minC⊆V :|C|=k τ
∗[C]]
14 return γ∗[V ]
In lines 1-4 we initialize data structures, i.e., array τ∗ holding the minimal time necessary to activate a
given set of nodes and array γ∗ holding the sequence allowing to activate a given set of nodes in this minimal
time. In k-th run of loop in line 5 we fill both arrays for these subsets of size k + 1 that can be activated
within time limit. We do it by iterating over the subsets of size k that can be activated within time limit in
loop in line 6 and trying to activate next node in loop in line 7. In line 8 we compute the time necessary to
active node v when previously we activated nodes in C in the best possible way. In lines 9-11 we update the
way of activating nodes C ∪ {v} if activating nodes in C first and node v after that is better then currently
known best solution. We end the algorithm either when it is no longer possible to activate any set of the
size k + 1 (in lines 12-13) or when we find a way of activating the entire network (in line 14).
Time complexity of the algorithm is O(2nn2), as for every of the O(2n) subsets of the set of nodes
we might need to iterate over O(n) of its neighbors and for each of them compute their expected time of
activation in time O(n). Notice that arrays can be implemented using hash tables. Given the exponential
time complexity of the algorithm, it is only suitable for small networks.
5.4 Finding Optimal Defense Against a Subset of Strategies
In this section, we present a mixed-integer-linear-programming method to compute optimal defense strategies
when the strategies of the attacker can be enumerated, i.e., when the set of the attacker’s strategies is of
reasonable size.
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Assume that the attacker has at her disposal only a limited set of strategies, Γˆ ⊆ Γ(V ). We assume that
each sequence in this set is a correct strategy of the attack, i.e., there is no attempt to activate nodes with
no active neighbors. In such case the problem of finding the optimal distribution of defense resources can be
formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming problem. The formulation is:
max
φv,aγ,i,k
k
subject to φv ≥ 0 ∀v∈V∑
v∈V
φv ≤ Φ
aγ,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀γ∈Γˆ∀i∈I∑
j≤i
d(γj) + φγj
cγ,j
≥ aγ,iT ∀γ∈Γˆ∀i∈I∑
i∈I
aγ,i ≥ k ∀γ∈Γˆ
where I = {1, . . . , n} and cγ,j is the number of active neighbors of γj at the moment of its activation,
when using attack sequence γ (we set cγ,1 = 1 for every γ ∈ Γˆ).
The first two sets of constraints guarantee that we have a valid distribution of security resources. When
the attacker is using attack sequence γ, we want variable aγ,i to be equal 1 if and only if node γi is not
activated within the time limit. This is guaranteed with the fourth set of constraints. In particular, we have
aγ,i = 1 only when the total time of activation of the first i nodes in the sequence (the left-hand side of the
fourth constraint) exceeds the time limit, T . The last set of constraints guarantees that k is the minimum
number of inactive nodes over all the choices of γ (the attacker minimizes this value, while the defender
maximizes it). The formulation has O(|Γˆ|n) constraints.
6 Attack and Defense Strategies based on Heuristics
Another approach that may be pursued by both the defender and the attacker is to resort to heuristic
strategies. In fact, one can think of many potential heuristics, depending on the the network topology and
the particular setting at hand. For instance, the heuristic strategies for recruitment to covert organizations
may be different from those for cyber-security applications, due to different goals of the attackers in each
of the scenarios. Hence, in this section we propose a number of different heuristics that are inspired by a
variety of scenarios and the results from the literature.
6.1 Heuristic Strategies of the Defender
To find a suitable heuristic, we should take into account the information possessed by the players. In
particular, the defender does not know a priori, where the attack is going to take place. Hence, the heuristic
strategy of assigning available security resources to all nodes should be based on some properties of either
the security game or the network as no other information is available at this stage. Given this, our first
strategy for the defender is inspired by the work of Bachrach et al. [7] who found that in their model of
security games the optimum is achieved when security levels are equal for all targets:
• Equality—the defender tries to make the activation time equal for as many nodes as possible (as it
may not be possible for all nodes). In particular, the function chosen by the defender is:
φ(vi) = max(0, s
∗ − d(vi)),
where s∗ is the maximal s such that
∑n
i=1 max(0, s− d(vi)) ≤ Φ.
Another related but different heuristic is to simply divide the resources equally:
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• Uniform—the security resources are distributed uniformly among all nodes, i.e., the function chosen
by the defender is:
φ(vi) =
Φ
n
.
Next, we propose six heuristics for the defender that are based on the topology of the network. The basic
idea is to assign available security resources either proportionally or inverse proportionally to the centrality,
i.e., the importance, of nodes in the network. The following set of heuristics for the defender are based on
the centrality measures presented in Section 3.2:
• High Degree—the defender focuses on defending nodes with high degrees, by choosing the function:
φ(vi) =
cdegr(vi)∑n
i=1 cdegr(vi)
Φ.
The inspiration for this strategy can be found in a number of works that indicate that hubs are of the
key importance in the diffusion process [34, 14].
• Low Degree—the defender focuses on defending the nodes with low degrees, by choosing the function:
φ(vi) =
c−1degr(vi)∑n
i=1 c
−1
degr(vi)
Φ.
This strategy is inspired by the observation that some extremist organizations tend to recruit lonely,
socially-isolated people [37].
• High Betweenness—the defender focuses on defending the nodes with high betweenness, by choosing
the function:
φ(vi) =
cbetw(vi)∑n
i=1 cbetw(vi)
Φ.
Betweenness centrality is considered particularly important in the context of financial networks, where
it is arguably the most sensible measure of the systemic danger of an individual bank within the
financial system [18]. In particular, banks with high betweenness centrality are able to bring down
the entire financial system if consecutive occurrences of illiquidity materialize, given that there are no
interventions by relevant authorities.
The next two strategies are inspired by the observation that nodes with low betweenness centrality and
(typically) high closeness centrality play the role of the “pulse-takers” in their organizations [22]. They are
easily accessible by other central nodes as well as to the rest of the network. The pulse-takers are key to the
preservation and the development of companies [44] and as such are more likely to be a subject of various
attacks, such as an advanced ransomware attack [50].
• Low Betweenness—the defender focuses on defending the nodes with low betweenness, by choosing the
function:
φ(vi) =
c−1betw(vi)∑n
i=1 c
−1
betw(vi)
Φ.
• High Closeness—the defender focuses on defending the nodes with high closeness, by choosing the
function:
φ(vi) =
cclos(vi)∑n
i=1 cclos(vi)
Φ.
Finally, we consider the heuristic strategy focused on the nodes with low closeness. In the social network
context, such nodes tend to be vulnerable (easier to target) as more isolated and dependent on information
from few neighbours [36].
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• Low Closeness—the defender focuses on defending the nodes with low closeness, by choosing the
function:
φ(vi) =
c−1betw(vi)∑n
i=1 c
−1
betw(vi)
Φ.
6.2 Heuristic Strategies of the Attacker
Unlike the defender, who has to choose her moves a priori, the attacker knows at each step of her decision-
making process which nodes in the network have been already activated and which have not, as well as she
knows the distribution of security resources chosen by the defender. This immediately suggest the following
two heuristics in which the attacker may use this information to her advantage:
• Greedy—the heuristic in which the next target is a not-yet-activated node with the lowest expected
time of activation; and
• Majority—the heuristic in which the next target is a not-yet-activated node with the highest number
of activated neighbours.
In comparison to the Greedy heuristic, the Majority heuristic has a tendency to activate nodes with high
degrees earlier in the process. One can also mix both heuristics:
• Mixed—a mix of the two previous heuristics that we will denote by Mixed(p), where p is the probability
of using the Greedy heuristic and 1− p is the probability of using the Majority heuristic.
The above three heuristics were already studied in the work by Alshamsi et al. [5] and were shown to be
reasonably effective for the attacker, however not in the setting that involves a strategic defender.
A parallel can be drawn between using the Greedy and Majority heuristics and the tradeoff between
exploration and exploitation [26]. In particular, the Greedy strategy can be considered the exploitation
component of the setting, as it maximizes short-term gains. At the same time, the Majority heuristic has
a tendency to target high degree nodes, thus exploring new potential venues of an attack for the future,
although the immediate cost of such an attack is usually higher than for the Greedy heuristic.
Following this trail, we propose yet another two heuristics for the attacker that are inspired by the
exploration-exploitation literature [45]:
• Epsilon-Decreasing—a heuristic that exhibits exploratory behaviour at the beginning and exploitative
behaviour at the end of the process. In more detail, we set the probability of selecting the target using
the Greedy heuristic to p = tT , where t is the time elapsed since the beginning of the attack process
and T is the total time limit. Otherwise, we select the target using the Majority heuristic.
• Epsilon-First—a heuristic that at first exhibits only exploratory behaviour, followed by only exploita-
tive behaviour. In more detail, we select the target using the Majority heuristic if t ≤ T , where 
is the parameter of the heuristics, while t and T are defined as for the Epsilon-Decreasing heuristic.
Otherwise we select the target using the Greedy heuristic.
In the next section, we will evaluate all the above heuristic strategies by the means of numerical simula-
tions.
7 Experimental Analysis
We will now test the heuristics proposed in the previous section across different combinations of networks
and strategies.
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7.1 Experiment Design
The setting of each of our experiments is characterised by (a) a network, G, (b) a strategy of the defender,
φ, and (c) a strategy of the attacker γ.
As for (a), we use the following models to generate the networks:
• Preferential attachment networks generated using the Baraba´si-Albert model [8]. We denote such a
network by PrefAtt(n, d), where n is the number of nodes and d is the number of links added with
each node. We set the size of the initial clique to d;
• Scale-free networks generated using the configuration model [31]. We denote such a network by
ScFree(n, dmin, dmax), where n is the number of nodes, dmin is the minimal degree of a node and
dmax is the maximal degree of a node. The configuration model parameter is λ = 3;
• Random graphs generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model [16]. We denote such a network by RanGr(n, d),
where n is the number of nodes and d is the expected average degree.
As for (b)—i.e., the defender’s strategy—we consider all the defense heuristics proposed in the previous
section. Moreover, we compare these heuristics to the following two benchmarks:
• Optimal—whenever practical given our available computational resources, we find the optimal strategy
using the mixed-integer linear programming method presented in Section 5.4.
• Random—the security resources are distributed randomly among all nodes, i.e., the function chosen
by the defender is:
φ(vi) =
ri∑n
i=1 ri
Φ,
where each ri is drawn uniformly at random from [0, 1].
In our experiments, we assume that the amount of security resources is Φ = 10n and the time limit is
T = n. These parameters’ values allow us to clearly present trends appearing for different settings of our
experiments.
As for (c)—i.e., the attacker’s strategy—we again consider all attack heuristics proposed in the previ-
ous section. We benchmark them against the optimal attack strategy which we find using the dynamic-
programming algorithm presented in Section 5.3. However, the dynamic-programming algorithm is time and
memory intensive and we are able to apply it in practice only for smaller networks. Furthermore, following
the usual assumption in the security games literature [7, 1, 30], we choose the the seed node of the attacker
that provides the highest number of activated nodes (breaking ties uniformly at random).
7.2 Simulation Results
We now move to describing the results of our simulations. We describe results for each size of networks
separately.
7.2.1 Small networks
Figures 3 and 4 presents our results for networks with 80 nodes, taken as an average over 100 simulations,
with a new network generated for each simulation using one of the models described in Section 7.1. We
generate networks of this size to be able to compare the performance of heuristic solutions against the
optimal strategy of the attacker.
Interestingly, the Uniform strategy is one of the most effective ways of defending the network in many
cases. At the same time, the Equality strategy usually gets considerably worse results than the Uniform
strategy. This seems to be the case because, while the Equality strategy aims to compensate differences in the
time of activation between nodes with different degrees, the Uniform strategy keeps hubs harder to activate
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than other nodes, discouraging the attacker from targeting them. The High Degree strategy, focusing
its defense efforts on hubs, is also relatively effective, especially in case of the networks with preferential
attachment properties. It discourages the attacker from activating high-degree nodes giving access to large
parts of the network. Low Degree and Random strategies are less effective in most cases.
Out of the centrality-based defender strategies, the Low Betweenness strategy is always more effective
than its High Betweenness counterpart. The efficiency of the Low Betweenness strategy might seem surprising
at first. However, low betweenness centrality values are characteristic of not only peripheral nodes in the
network, but also of the members of dense network structures (e.g., in a clique the betweenness centrality
of all nodes is zero) that are typically high return targets for the attacker, as the activation of each of them
affects many peers. In fact, the Low Betweenness strategy in many cases is one of the most effective ways of
defending the network.
Out of the defender strategies based on closeness centrality, their relative effectiveness depends on the
network model under consideration. The High Closeness strategy is more effective in majority of the simu-
lations for all three models, ranging from 61.8% of the simulations for the random graphs, through 80.1%
for the scale-free networks, up to 86.9% for the preferential attachment networks. Nevertheless, they usu-
ally achieve similar performance and choosing the right closeness-based strategy is a highly effective way of
defending the network.
Interestingly, these results can be connected to the role of nodes with low betweenness centrality and
high closeness centrality as the “pulse-takers” of their organizations [22], mentioned in Section 6.2.
We will now consider the choice the best defense heuristic under assumption that the attacker utilizes
her optimal strategy, so in the worst possible situation for the defender. The best defender’s choice depends
on the generation model of the network. In case of the random graphs the Low Closeness heuristic gives
the best results (even though it is on average worse than its high closeness counterpart when considering all
different attacker’s strategies), with Uniform heuristic being close second. In case of the scale-free networks
the Uniform heuristic provides the best results for the defender. When the preferential attachment networks
are considered, the Uniform and the Low Betweenness heuristics offer the best protection, closely followed
by the High Closeness heuristic. As it can be seen, in most cases the Uniform heuristic is a valid choice,
albeit not always the best one.
From the attacker’s point of view, if she is unable to compute the optimal solution, in most cases using
the Greedy strategy with a high probability is the best choice and close to the optimal one. Most of the
Mixed strategy plots are U-shaped, with pure Majority and pure Greedy strategies giving better results than
adding a small percentage of the other strategy into the mix. The Epsilon-First strategy generally achieves
better results than simple mix, while the Epsilon-Decreasing strategy is in most cases worse than both pure
Majority and pure Greedy strategies.
As for the comparison between different network generation models in terms of attack potential, networks
with exponential degree distributions (i.e., preferential attachment and scale-free networks) are on average
easier to attack than these with more uniform distribution (with the exception of the High Degree strategy,
confirming the key role of hubs in diffusion process [34]). This may be due to the fact that hubs in networks
with exponential degree distributions are more connected, and activating them gives easy access to a large
part of the network.
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Figure 3: The results for networks with 80 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal to
pure Greedy (as indicated in one of the plots). Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals, albeit
they are very small.
19
High Closeness Low Closeness High Betw. Low Betw.
P
re
fA
tt
(8
0
,3
)
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
S
cF
re
e(
8
0
,2
,1
0
)
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
R
a
n
G
r(
8
0
,1
0
)
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
6
8
10
12
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Epsilon-Decreasing Epsilon-First Mixed Optimal
Figure 4: The results for networks with 80 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal
to pure Greedy. Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals, albeit they are very small.
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7.2.2 Large Networks
Figures 5 and 6 present our results for networks with 1000 nodes, taken as an average over 100 simulations.
Because of the time and memory complexities we are unable to compute the optimal solution for networks
of this size. However, we present results of the heuristic algorithms to observe how trends in them change
with the size of the network.
Most of our observations made for the smaller networks remain valid. One notable difference in terms
of defender strategies is a great increase of the effectiveness of High Degree strategy. In most cases it now
outperforms Uniform strategy and the difference is especially striking in case of the preferential attachment
networks. In this type of networks the expected degree of hubs greatly increases with size of the network,
hence the attacker’s advantage from activating a hub and gaining access to a large part of the network is
also much higher. Because of this, focusing defender’s efforts on protecting high degree nodes significantly
improves effectiveness of the defense.
Another notable difference is how the effectiveness of High Betweenness strategy greatly depends on
the strategy of the attacker. While it has considerable variance in effectiveness even for smaller networks
considered in Section 7.2.1, for larger networks it achieves both the best and the worst results throughout
all defender strategies. It is particularly efficient to use the High Betweenness strategy against attacker
strategies utilizing Majority with high probability, while we observe much worse performance against Greedy-
intensive attacker strategies. A possible explanation is that in larger networks, especially these with scale-free
properties, the distribution of betweenness centrality values among nodes is more heterogenous. Majority
strategy, ignoring actual time of activation of the nodes, is unable to avoid attacking high betweenness,
strongly defended nodes, while Greedy strategy is able to do so.
Another difference is that the Epsilon-Decreasing strategy, usually achieving poor performance for small
networks, in large networks is doing better in comparison to Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies. In many
cases it has better results than pure Majority or pure Greedy strategies, depending on the defender’s strat-
egy. Similarly, for Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies a particular parametrization often achieves better
performance than pure Greedy and Majority strategies.
Since we are unable to compute the optimal strategy of the attacker for large networks, we will now
analyze the choice of the defender’s heuristic under assumption that the attacker will use the best response
out of her strategies considered in the paper (in most cases a particular parameterization of the Epsilon-
First strategy). In case of the random graphs a few heuristics have very similar effectiveness, namely High
Closeness, High Degree, Uniform and Low Betweenness (the difference between the best and the worst of
them is smaller than 1 active node). For the scale-free network the Low Betweenness heuristic offers the best
performance, with the Uniform heuristic being a close second. Finally, in case of the preferential attachment
networks, the best choice of the defender is to use the High Degree heuristic.
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Figure 5: The results for networks with 1000 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal to
pure Greedy (as indicated in one of the plots). Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals, albeit
they are very small.
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Figure 6: The results for networks with 1000 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal to
pure Greedy (as indicated in one of the plots). Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals, albeit
they are very small.
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7.2.3 Experimental Results with Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
To test the effectiveness of mixed-integer linear programming in finding the optimal strategy of the de-
fender we perform experiments on randomly generated networks. In order to avoid selecting arbitrary set of
strategies Γˆ available to the attacker, we allow the attacker to choose any strategy. However, under these
assumptions, we are able to solve mixed-integer linear programming instance efficiently only for very small
networks. A potential idea for future work is studying whether there exists a way of finding a set Γˆ of limited
size that is still guaranteed to always contain the optimal attacker strategy.
Figures 7 and 8 present our results for networks with 6 nodes, taken as an average over 100 simulations.
Mixed-integer linear programming were solved using lp solve solver version 5.5.2.5.
As it can be seen, distribution of security resources computed using mixed-integer linear programming is
considerably more successful in mitigating the attack than most of the other defense strategy, with centrality-
based heuristics closely following. This suggests that, at least in case of simple structures of very small
networks, centrality measures may be close to capturing the complexity of the problem of finding the optimal
defense.
Another difference in comparison to results for larger networks is that all considered strategies of the
attacker achieve very similar results. Very small number of nodes results in fairly limited variety of valid
strategies available to the attacker.
8 Concluding Remarks & Future Work
In this work we contribute to the literature of security games by introducing a new attack scenario. We
considered the problem of defending the network from a sequential attack that is strategically planned and
controlled by the attacker, rather than one that spreads due to a stochastic process. We proved that finding
an optimal way to spread the attack is an NP-complete task in a general case, which suggests that the
attacker may not always utilize the best way of diffusion. We found optimal strategies for simple network
structures and formulated the problem of finding an optimal way of defending the network as a mixed-integer
linear programming. For large and complex networks, we experimentally analyzed ways of defending the
network from various types of attacks. We found that the highest utility of the defender is achieved by
either utilizing one of network centrality measures (in heterogeneous networks), or spreading the available
security resources uniformly across all nodes (in more homogeneous networks). In most cases the attacker
can achieve high utility by using the greedy strategy with a high probability.
In a broader context, our work can be applicable and extended to other types of sequential attacks on
a network [32], that are used to model, for instance, competitive adoption of a product [10] and protecting
computer networks [15].
As for the ideas for future work, one possible venue is more in-depth analysis of the exploration-
exploitation techniques. In this work we considered only two simple techniques. Using more intricate
learning techniques [23] might yield better results in adjusting a strategy of the attacker. Another interest-
ing problem would be to consider a setting where, instead of playing just one game, players can face each
other off multiple times on the same network and they modify their strategies as the process goes on. Finding
an equilibrium of this repeated game may lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of defending a
network against a strategic continuous attack.
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Figure 7: The results for networks with 6 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal
to pure Greedy. Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 8: The results for networks with 6 nodes. Each row of the plots represents a model of network
generation, each column of the plots represents a strategy of the defender, and each line in any plot represents
the final number of activated nodes for a strategy of the attacker (the y-axis). In the case of the Mixed
strategy, the x-axis represents the probability of using the Greedy strategy by the attacker vs. the Majority
strategy. In the case of the Epsilon-First strategy, the x-axis represents the value of 1− . This implies that
for x = 0 the Mixed and Epsilon-First strategies are equal to pure Majority, while for x = 1 they are equal
to pure Greedy. Colored areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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